Global crude oil supply and export flows Report Interpretation

Overview

This commodities note examines conflicting estimates of oil leaving the Middle East Gulf and argues that two recent developments may be tightening global crude supply: a material loss of Saudi export capacity following the Houthi blockade and a reduction in US supply accommodation as crude imports rise and SPR releases approach a potential pause.

Core views

The report first reconciles conflicting claims that 4 mmb/d to 9 mmb/d of crude and refined products are leaving the Middle East Gulf. Deutsche Bank notes that the figures may use different definitions: its tracked Strait of Hormuz outflows were about 5 mmb/d in early July, while the difference versus the US Energy Secretary's 9 mmb/d estimate could be explained by Saudi exports departing through the Red Sea via Bab el Mandeb. It also finds the split between non-Iranian and Iranian liquids exports heavily skewed, with Iran accounting for only 0.11 mmb/d in mid-August. The central supply-disruption argument is that the Houthi blockade has reduced Saudi crude exports. Saudi crude flows through Bab el Mandeb have dropped to zero. Although Saudi northbound exports through the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline reportedly increased from 1.0 mmb/d in July to 2.3 mmb/d in August, this 1.3 mmb/d gain only partly offsets an estimated 4 mmb/d decline through Bab el Mandeb. On that basis, the report estimates a net 2.7 mmb/d reduction in Saudi export capability since July. This appears inconsistent with the Saudi Aramco CEO's early-August statement that Houthi threats had not dented export volumes, although the report cautions that higher Saudi summer domestic demand may also have reduced crude available for export. The blockade also appears to have affected Russian crude moving from the Black Sea, and possibly the Baltics, through Bab el Mandeb to Asian customers. These flows fell from 3.2 mmb/d in July to 2.0 mmb/d in August. Deutsche Bank's base case is that the affected Russian barrels are rerouted rather than removed from supply, so this does not automatically constitute net global supply tightening. A second tightening channel is the United States. US net crude imports rose sharply from 2.5 mmb/d to 4.3 mmb/d in the week ending 7 August, accompanied by higher commercial crude inventories; the report identifies this as the highest net-import reading since June 2025. While this may be a one-week effect, it means the US is offering the least supply accommodation to the global crude market since early March. Deutsche Bank further notes that 116.4 mmbbl of 133.6 mmbbl awarded for SPR exchanges had already been released, against a 172 mmbbl obligation under the IEA-coordinated release. Unless the Department of Energy awards sufficient additional exchanges, releases could halt after the first 133.6 mmbbl; at the then-current release rate of about 870 kb/d, this would leave roughly three weeks of releases. An end to releases would likely raise US crude net imports and tighten the global crude balance.

Analysis framework

The report compares observed tanker-flow routes and reported export volumes to separate oil leaving the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz from Saudi volumes leaving via the Red Sea. It then calculates the residual loss of Saudi export capability after rerouting through Suez/SUMED, assesses whether lower Russian transit volumes represent lost supply or rerouting, and combines these findings with US import, inventory and SPR-release data to judge the global supply balance.

Methodology notes

• Industry AnalysisSupply-demand framework

  Global crude supply-demand balance analysis using export flows, routing changes, US imports, inventories and SPR releases.

  The report treats disrupted Saudi export routes and a possible reduction in US SPR supply as factors that reduce available supply to the global crude market, while distinguishing Russian rerouting from an actual supply loss.

• Industry AnalysisUpstream-Midstream-Downstream Transmission

  Physical crude-routing analysis across Bab el Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the SUMED pipeline and destination markets.

  The report follows how disrupted seaborne routes affect Saudi and Russian crude movements and whether alternative routes compensate for lost export capacity.

Key data

• Saudi export-capability change-2.7 mmb/d since JulyEstimated from a 4 mmb/d fall in Bab el Mandeb exports offset by a 1.3 mmb/d rise via Suez/SUMED.
• Saudi northbound flows via Suez/SUMED1.0 mmb/d in July to 2.3 mmb/d in AugustPartial compensation for lost Red Sea flows.
• Russian crude transiting Bab el Mandeb3.2 mmb/d in July to 2.0 mmb/d in AugustThe report's base case is rerouting rather than net supply loss.
• US net crude imports2.5 mmb/d to 4.3 mmb/dIncrease in the week ending 7 August; highest level since June 2025.
• SPR exchange volumes116.4 mmbbl released out of 133.6 mmbbl awarded; 172 mmbbl IEA obligationAt about 870 kb/d, the awarded releases could last roughly three more weeks.

Impact & implications

Deutsche Bank argues that the combination of reduced Saudi export capability and a possible end or pause in US SPR releases would leave the global crude market tighter. The report does not assume that lower Russian transit volumes are a net supply loss because those barrels may be rerouted.

Risks

• The estimated Saudi export reduction may partly reflect seasonal summer domestic demand rather than only the Houthi blockade.
• The rise in US crude net imports may be a one-week blip rather than a sustained trend.
• Lower Russian flows through Bab el Mandeb may be rerouted and therefore may not reduce global supply.

What to watch

• Whether Saudi export flows through Bab el Mandeb recover and whether additional Suez/SUMED routing further offsets the lost route.
• Whether US crude net imports and commercial inventories remain elevated after the week ending 7 August.
• Whether the Department of Energy awards enough additional SPR exchanges to avoid a pause after the initial 133.6 mmbbl.
• The trajectory of Russian Black Sea crude shipments and their ultimate delivery routes.