France’s 2027 presidential and legislative elections: Goldman Sachs’ model places Le Pen as the most likely 2027 presidential winner, while a hung parliament remains a material risk.

Overview

Goldman Sachs introduces a joint poll-based model of France’s 2027 presidential and subsequent legislative elections. Its central result is that Le Pen winning both the presidency and a parliamentary majority is currently the most likely outcome, but parliamentary fragmentation remains a substantial alternative with implications for fiscal policy, structural reforms and France’s approach to Europe.

Core views

France’s presidential election is scheduled for 18 April and 2 May 2027, with legislative elections likely to follow early thereafter. Goldman Sachs views the combined electoral outcome as the main uncertainty for the French economic outlook because it will shape fiscal policy, the scope for structural reforms and the country’s stance on European issues. The report’s model assigns a 68% probability to Marine Le Pen winning the presidency. The largest single joint outcome is a Le Pen presidency with an absolute parliamentary majority, at 39%; the model puts the probability of a hung parliament, regardless of the president, at 26%. A president spanning the centre-left to centre-right winning a majority has a 14% probability, while a Mélenchon presidency with a majority has a 3% probability. For the presidential first round, the model simulates vote shares from a joint Student-t distribution rather than a normal distribution, using its fatter tails to allow for larger electoral surprises. Candidate trends are estimated from first-round polls with a Generalised Additive Model that includes pollster fixed effects. Le Pen is estimated to be polling at 34%, versus Philippe at 19%, Attal and Mélenchon at 15%, Glucksmann at 10%, and Retailleau at 8%. Historical polling comparisons suggest little average first-round bias for most groups, but Mélenchon outperformed late poll trends by 4 percentage points on average in 2017 and 2022. The baseline corrects half of that apparent bias, adding 2 percentage points to Mélenchon’s modeled first-round share. Uncertainty is calibrated to average polling errors since 2002 at this stage of an election and narrows as the vote approaches; errors are allowed to be negatively correlated across candidates. The model assumes Philippe and Attal will not compete against each other, retaining the candidate with the higher simulated vote share. Philippe leads Attal by 4 percentage points in polls and is selected in 65% of simulations. Le Pen is very likely to reach the second round; Philippe and Mélenchon each have a 35% probability of qualifying. The latter’s chances reflect the historical adjustment for his first-round polling surprises. Goldman Sachs compares its qualification results with Polymarket: they are broadly similar, except prediction markets see Mélenchon as more competitive. Fully applying the historical Mélenchon adjustment would bring the model closer to that market view. Second-round outcomes depend materially on Le Pen’s opponent. The model uses configuration-specific polling distributions and, where polling is unavailable, a vote-transfer matrix. It adjusts for Le Pen’s average 5-percentage-point underperformance against Emmanuel Macron in the prior two elections by correcting half that bias in a run-off against a centrist such as Philippe or Attal. No equivalent adjustment is made against Mélenchon or other contenders because the report does not consider the evidence sufficient. Le Pen is projected to win 95% of run-offs against Mélenchon, supported by a nearly 40-percentage-point polling lead, but only 51% against Philippe, where a narrow poll lead is offset by the centrist-run-off adjustment. This opponent sensitivity explains why Philippe is the second-most-likely presidential winner despite Le Pen’s overall lead. For the legislative election, the model carries simulated presidential first-round vote shares into a constituency-based framework, supported by a strong historical correlation between presidential and subsequent legislative first-round party shares. It assumes left parties run as one group, combining Mélenchon and Glucksmann vote shares, while other parties run separately. The framework incorporates a historical ‘winner’s bonus’ for the president’s party, rescales the 2024 legislative result across 577 constituencies, assumes 2024 turnout, and applies withdrawal behavior observed in 2024. High turnout can sustain a large number of three- and four-way run-offs. In races where RN finished first or second, third-placed centrist candidates withdrew 72% of the time when the other finalist was from La France Insoumise and 89% when the other finalist was from another NFP left party; the report also notes less withdrawal against far-left candidates and lower centre-right withdrawal rates. Conditional on Le Pen becoming president, RN has a 56% probability of an absolute majority, a 24% probability of requiring a centre-right coalition, and a 19% probability of a hung parliament with no workable majority. Goldman Sachs finds Philippe would be less likely than Le Pen to secure a majority if elected because a left coalition would often outpoll his centrist party despite presidential tailwinds; Mélenchon, by contrast, would be relatively likely to win a majority if elected. The institution plans regular model updates as polls arrive, with possible revisions for the centre and centre-left candidate choices, the left’s coalition decision, and any constituency allocation among left parties. It advises close scrutiny of Le Pen’s economic and European proposals and continued attention to the economic and fiscal consequences of a continuing hung parliament.

Analysis framework

Goldman Sachs combines polling trends, historical polling errors and stochastic simulations to estimate first- and second-round presidential outcomes. It then maps simulated national vote shares into a constituency-level legislative model using historical presidential-legislative relationships, a presidential winner’s bonus, turnout assumptions, coalition assumptions and 2024 withdrawal patterns.

Methodology notes

• Quantitative, Factor, and Portfolio Theory

  Poll-based stochastic election simulation

  The report repeatedly draws candidate vote shares from probability distributions to estimate the frequency of possible presidential and parliamentary outcomes.

• Event-Driven and Behavioral FinanceEvent-driven analysis

  Joint presidential and legislative election scenario analysis

  The analysis models how candidate qualification, run-off pairings, coalitions and parliamentary outcomes combine into political scenarios relevant to the economic outlook.

Key data

• Le Pen probability of winning presidency68%Model estimate based on simulated qualification and second-round outcomes.
• Le Pen presidency plus absolute parliamentary majority39%Most likely joint presidential-legislative scenario in the model.
• Hung parliament probability26%Probability regardless of who becomes president.
• RN absolute-majority probability conditional on Le Pen presidency56%Alternative conditional outcomes are 24% requiring a centre-right coalition and 19% hung parliament.
• Le Pen run-off win probability versus Mélenchon95%Supported by a nearly 40-percentage-point second-round poll lead.
• Le Pen run-off win probability versus Philippe51%Reflects a narrow polling lead and a correction for historical underperformance against centrists.
• Le Pen first-round voting intention34%Current poll trend used by the model.
• Philippe and Mélenchon second-round qualification probabilities35% eachBoth are modeled as equally likely to qualify for the presidential run-off.

Impact & implications

The report frames the 2027 election sequence as a key determinant of France’s fiscal-policy path, reform capacity and European posture. It highlights both the need to assess Le Pen’s economic and European proposals and the possibility that a hung parliament could perpetuate economic and fiscal constraints.

Risks

• A hung parliament could continue, creating economic and fiscal uncertainty.
• The modeled outcome is sensitive to candidate selection in the centre and centre-left, left-wing coalition choices and constituency allocation.
• Poll-based probabilities may change as incoming polls and electoral conditions evolve.

What to watch

• Incoming polling trends and the model’s regular updates.
• Whether Philippe or Attal becomes the centrist candidate.
• Whether Glucksmann formalises a bid.
• Whether left parties run as a coalition and how they allocate constituencies.
• Le Pen’s proposals on the economy and Europe.
• Developments affecting the likelihood and economic implications of a hung parliament.