Quick Summary
Covering the latest research from top Wall Street investment banks

The Bank of Japan needs to be more alert to inflation risks than during the second oil crisis

Institution
Deutsche Bank
Date
2026-05-27
Authors
Kentaro Koyama, Ph.D.
Company
-
Ticker
-
Industry
Macroeconomy/Monetary Policy
Rating
-
NeutralLow confidenceThe report argues that the near-term risk of a wage-price spiral is limited, but Japan is currently more inflation-prone than during the second oil crisis due to labor shortages, a weaker yen, and the degree of monetary easing, so the Bank of Japan needs to normalize policy in a timely manner.
AuthorsKentaro Koyama, Ph.D.
Asset classesFX
Business segmentsBank of Japan Monetary Policy、Inflation and Wages、Oil Price Shock
Research firm divisions/subsidiariesDeutsche Bank(Other)

AI summary card

The Bank of Japan needs to be more alert to inflation risks than during the second oil crisis

Deutsche Bank believes Japan’s near-term wage-price spiral risk is low, but if high inflation feeds into the 2027 spring wage negotiations and the Bank of Japan delays normalization, upside inflation risks will rise significantly.

No stock rating, target price, or upside potential; the core policy view is that the Bank of Japan should avoid missing the normalization window while assessing the data.
Bank of JapanMonetary policyWage-price spiralOil price shockYenInflation
  • Japan’s corporate goods price index rose 2.3% MoM in April, the largest increase since 1980 excluding periods of consumption tax hikes, with upstream price pressures nearing historical oil shock levels.
  • Current unit labor cost growth is above the level before the second oil crisis, and labor shortages are more severe, but the 2026 spring wage negotiations have largely concluded, limiting the near-term risk of a sharp wage surge.
  • The current degree of policy-rate easing relative to nominal growth is the highest since 1980. Even though rate hikes began after 2024, the Bank of Japan still faces the risk of lagging policy normalization.
  • The report judges that the current environment differs from the first oil crisis, but is more inflationary than the second oil crisis because the yen no longer provides a buffer, unit labor cost pressures are higher, and policy remains accommodative.

Report interpretation

Overview

This report centers on Bank of Japan Governor Ueda’s remarks at an international conference on May 27, 2026, comparing Japan’s current inflation environment with the initial conditions during the 1973 and 1980 oil crises. The report focuses on wage dynamics and the monetary policy stance, arguing that an immediate wage-price spiral is unlikely in the short term, but that Japan’s economy is in a more inflation-prone environment than during the second oil crisis given historic labor shortages, yen weakness, and still-accommodative policy.

Core views

The report’s core judgments are as follows: first, rising oil prices have pushed upstream price pressures close to historical oil-crisis levels; second, current unit labor costs and labor shortages warrant caution, but since the 2026 spring wage negotiations have largely concluded, the probability of a sharp short-term wage increase is low; third, if high inflation is converted into stronger wage demands in the 2027 spring wage negotiations, inflation could persist longer; fourth, the Bank of Japan’s current policy remains significantly accommodative, and if normalization is delayed when domestically driven wage inflation emerges, the risk of accelerating inflation will rise materially.

Analysis framework

The report uses a historical comparative framework, comparing today’s Japanese economy with the periods of the first and second oil crises, focusing on the six initial conditions proposed by Governor Ueda and further quantifying unit labor costs, wage growth, labor supply and demand, the yen exchange rate, and the gap between policy rates and nominal growth.

Methodology notes

  • Macro policy comparisonGovernor Ueda’s six initial conditions framework

    Initial conditions of inflation shocks

    The framework includes wage dynamics and labor supply-demand conditions, inflation expectations, price and wage-setting norms, exchange rates, pre-shock demand momentum, and the monetary policy stance, and is used to judge why shocks of the same magnitude can produce different inflation outcomes.

  • Inflation transmission analysisUnit labor cost analysis

    Wage-price spiral

    The report measures unit labor costs using nominal employee compensation divided by real GDP to assess whether corporate labor cost pressures could reinforce wages and prices.

  • Monetary policy stance assessmentPolicy rate vs. nominal growth gap

    Proxy indicator for the nominal neutral rate

    The report uses the four-year moving average of nominal GDP growth as a proxy for the nominal neutral rate and compares the position of the policy rate relative to nominal growth to assess whether policy is accommodative or tight.

Asset mapping & comparison

Structured mapping from thesis to named assets (strengths, weaknesses, peers, risks).

  • JPY (Japanese yen)
    The yen’s trajectory is one of the initial conditions for inflation
    Strengths
    If the yen appreciates, it could partially buffer imported inflation pressure as it did during the second oil crisis.
    Weaknesses
    The yen is currently weak, which instead amplifies imported costs and energy price shocks.
    Comparison
    The report notes that yen appreciation during the second oil crisis provided a buffer, whereas current yen weakness is a headwind.
    Risks
    A delayed Bank of Japan rate hike response or a rise in external oil prices could increase yen-related inflation pressure.
  • Japanese government bonds/yen rates
    Affected by the Bank of Japan’s normalization path
    Strengths
    If nominal growth slows and inflation does not spread, upward pressure on rates may be limited.
    Weaknesses
    If wage-driven inflation takes hold, the need for policy normalization could push yields higher.
    Comparison
    After the second oil crisis, the policy rate was raised above nominal growth, helping restrain inflation; current policy remains clearly accommodative.
    Risks
    If delayed policy response later forces faster tightening, bond volatility may increase.
  • Japanese equities
    Indirectly affected through wage costs, inflation, and policy rates
    Strengths
    If inflation remains under control and nominal growth is maintained, corporate revenues may benefit from price pass-through.
    Weaknesses
    Rising unit labor costs could compress corporate margins, while higher rates may also weigh on valuations.
    Comparison
    Current labor shortages and wage pressures are higher than before the second oil crisis, requiring greater attention to corporate cost pressures.
    Risks
    If the 2027 spring wage negotiations bring strong wage demands, both margins and valuations could come under pressure.

Key data

  • April corporate goods price index+2.3% MoMThis was the largest month-on-month increase since the second oil crisis in 1980, excluding periods of consumption tax hikes.
  • Wage growth before the first oil crisis+15% to +20% YoYBefore the 1973 shock, nominal wages in Japan were already growing rapidly, and after oil prices rose the peak moved closer to 30%.
  • Current unit labor cost conditionAbove the level before the 1979 second oil crisisAt the same time, the Bank of Japan Tankan employment conditions DI shows that current labor shortages are more severe than during the historical oil shock periods.
  • Impact of the 2026 spring wage negotiationsLimited short-term transmissionThe rise in crude oil prices occurred after the 2026 spring wage negotiations had largely ended, so the response of base wages to higher prices may be delayed until the following year.
  • Current degree of monetary easingHighest since 1980Even though rate hikes have already begun since 2024, the policy rate relative to nominal growth still indicates a highly accommodative stance.

Impact & implications

For investors, the report suggests that the key variables for Japanese macro assets are shifting from a pure imported cost shock to a combination of wages, exchange rates, and policy response. In the short term, a wage-price spiral is not yet the base case; in the medium term, if the 2027 spring wage negotiations strengthen wage demands and the Bank of Japan fails to normalize in time, the yen, JGB yields, and Japanese inflation expectations could all be repriced.

Risks

  • Further escalation in Middle East tensions and crude oil prices, causing upstream price pressures to spread further.
  • Continued yen weakness, making imported inflation pressure higher than during the second oil crisis.
  • The 2027 spring wage negotiations convert 2026’s high inflation into stronger wage demands, creating more persistent inflation.
  • The Bank of Japan lags normalization when domestically driven wage inflation emerges, amplifying the risk of accelerating inflation.
  • Deteriorating terms of trade suppress demand, making policy judgment more difficult between slowing growth and rising inflation.

What to watch

  • Follow-up changes in crude oil prices, the Middle East situation, and Japan’s corporate goods price index.
  • Unit labor costs, base wages, bonuses, and real wage growth.
  • Wage demands and corporate responses in the 2027 spring wage negotiations.
  • The Bank of Japan Tankan employment conditions DI and whether labor shortages continue to worsen.
  • Whether the gap between the policy rate and nominal GDP growth narrows.
  • Bank of Japan meetings, Governor Ueda’s remarks, and the pace of policy normalization.
Zhejiang ICP No. 2022035445-5
Disclaimer: Market data, charts, indicators, research views, and other information provided on this website are intended solely for information display, research communication, and educational reference. They should not be regarded as personalized investment advice, securities recommendations, trading instructions, solicitations, or guarantees of return. While we strive to improve the reliability of our data and content, such information may still be subject to delays, errors, incompleteness, or untimely updates due to source differences, methodological limitations, system processing, or market volatility. Users should exercise independent judgment based on their own circumstances and bear all risks and responsibilities arising from the use of this website.

Settings

Sign in to view recent logins