SMRs are not the near-term answer to AI power demand; existing nuclear and uranium offer greater investment certainty

Overview

This report focuses on 79 small modular reactor projects globally and assesses which SMR designs are most likely to become commercial winners. Although the authors are broadly constructive on uranium and nuclear energy, they emphasize that SMR is not the near-term primary answer to AI power demand. If load growth is large, urgent, and requires stable 24/7 power, the first choice is more likely existing nuclear fleet life extension, uprates, restarts, and subsequent large-reactor construction. SMRs still have value but are better suited to narrower applications such as small grids, staged industrial loads, coal replacement sites, remote power, defense, and industrial heat.

Core views

Core views include: first, there is not yet a truly commercial SMR, and while many global projects exist, most remain in early stages; second, licensing and financing are the most critical thresholds for projects moving from concept to execution; third, fuel supply is not an afterthought but a prerequisite constraint for many advanced SMR designs; fourth, SMR unit-kilowatt costs may be 2 to 3 times AP1000 while capacity is less than one-third, so economics need stronger justification; and fifth, over the next decade the more important uranium-demand driver comes from restarts, life extension, and uprates of existing reactors, with large-scale SMR adoption as a potential additional upside factor.

Analysis framework

The report is based on the 79 SMR projects tracked by the NEA and places projects from different countries, regulatory systems, reactor designs, and business models into a unified comparison framework converted into a 100-point scoring system. Scoring prioritizes licensing and financing, while also incorporating fuel, site selection, supply chain, and project participation. The report then combines cost, schedule slippage, fuel availability, and uranium-enrichment supply-demand constraints to judge which projects are more likely to move from concept to commercial deployment.

Methodology notes

• project_screeningSMR 100-point weighted scorecard

  SMR project weighted scorecard

  Scoring dimensions include licensing, financing, fuel, site selection, supply chain, and participation; licensing and financing each account for 25% because these steps determine whether a project can move from concept to execution.

• fuel_cycle_analysisSWU and uranium overfeeding analysis

  SWU and overfeeding analysis

  The report uses SWU in uranium enrichment to explain that when enrichment capacity is constrained, enrichment providers may increase consumption of UF6 and U3O8 to reduce pressure on SWU, thereby increasing natural uranium demand.

• commercialization_assessmentFOAK to NOAK transition

  Commercial path from first-of-a-kind to mass replication

  The report argues that an SMR that can materially change the market must have a repeatable, modular, and bankable design, and must secure enough committed projects; of the 79 concepts, only a few winners are likely to remain.

Asset mapping & comparison

Structured mapping from thesis to named assets (strengths, weaknesses, peers, risks).

• GE Vernova (GEV)

  Potential beneficiary from BWRX-300 commercial deployment

  Strengths

  Through GEV Hitachi Nuclear Energy's involvement in BWRX-300, the first OPG Darlington unit is already under construction, and successful commercial deployment would drive upside.

  Weaknesses

  SMR commercialization still faces challenges in cost, licensing, fuel, and replicability.

  Comparison

  Compared with many early-stage SMR concepts, BWRX-300 is seen in the report as one of the designs more likely to make the small winner set.

  Risks

  Project delays, cost overruns, regulatory licensing, financing, and insufficient customer commitments.

• Cameco (CCJ)

  Uranium and Westinghouse-linked SMR upside beneficiary

  Strengths

  The report sees CCJ benefiting from the uranium cycle even without SMR success, and CCJ also holds a 49% stake in Westinghouse, with additional upside possible if AP300 and e-Vinci succeed.

  Weaknesses

  The SMR-success scenario is not explicitly included in valuation in the report, so short-term contribution is uncertain.

  Comparison

  Compared with pure SMR developers, CCJ's core investment case relies more on uranium supply-demand and the nuclear fuel cycle.

  Risks

  Uranium price volatility, enrichment supply-demand shifts, SMR commercialization underperformance, and policy and geopolitical risks.

• Constellation Energy (CEG)

  Beneficiary from existing nuclear restarts and life extension

  Strengths

  The report states that near-term activity is concentrated in existing nuclear plants, and CEG is among the main early beneficiaries, participating in multiple large restart projects.

  Weaknesses

  Benefit is more from existing nuclear assets than from an SMR technology inflection.

  Comparison

  Compared with SMRs, existing units offer more tangible megawatt capacity, clearer assets, and more immediate customer demand.

  Risks

  Restart approvals, capital expenditure, operational safety, labor costs, and power contract risks.

• Vistra (VST)

  Beneficiary from existing nuclear assets and restart projects

  Strengths

  The report names VST as one of the main early beneficiaries in near-term existing nuclear transactions.

  Weaknesses

  Direct SMR exposure is limited; the investment case depends on existing nuclear and electricity market dynamics.

  Comparison

  Similar to CEG, VST benefits more from currently available nuclear capacity than from long-horizon SMR commercialization.

  Risks

  Power price volatility, nuclear operational risk, and restart execution risk.

• Kazatomprom (KAP)

  Long-term uranium demand beneficiary

  Strengths

  The report believes KAP, like CCJ, can benefit from long-term uranium demand even without SMR success.

  Weaknesses

  Direct leverage to SMR commercialization is weaker than equipment and technology suppliers.

  Comparison

  KAP is closer to uranium commodity supply-demand exposure than to an SMR project optionality trade.

  Risks

  Uranium price, production operations, sulfuric acid supply, Inkai transparency, and geopolitical risk.

Key data

• NEA-tracked SMR project count79 projectsThe report uses the NEA SMR dashboard as the main project pool and notes that additional NuScale RoPower and more BWRX-300 projects are not fully included.
• Total project scale30+ GWthUsing an approximate 3:1 thermal-to-electric conversion relationship, this is equivalent to about 10 GWe of power capacity.
• Implied capital expenditureabout $100 billionThe report assumes SMR nuclear capex of about $10 billion per GW.
• Licensing and financing weight25% eachThe report believes these two hurdles most clearly distinguish conceptual projects from executable projects.
• Fuel, site, and supply-chain weight15% eachThese factors determine whether a project can truly be built, fueled, and replicated.
• DOE HALEU supply plan21 metric tons by June 2026Planned schedule is 3 metric tons in Sep 2024, 8 metric tons in Dec 2025, and 10 metric tons in Jun 2026; allocation does not equal commercial success.
• U.S. 2022 uranium purchase volume40.5M lbs U3O8The report notes that 12% came from Russia and was at a relatively low price.
• Russian enrichment capacity shareabout 40% by 2030Concentration in enrichment capacity and Russian uranium restrictions together form fuel supply risk.

Impact & implications

For investors, the report downplays SMRs as a high-certainty short-term play for AI electricity demand, and instead highlights the greater visibility of existing nuclear assets and uranium supply-demand dynamics. CEG and VST stand to benefit from restarts and revaluation of existing nuclear assets; GEV should get clear upside if BWRX-300 commercial deployment succeeds; CCJ and KAP can benefit from uranium demand and enrichment bottleneck-driven potential overfeeding even without SMR success.

Risks

• SMR commercialization timelines may continue to slip, with most projects unlikely to make substantive progress until after the mid-2030s.
• Insufficient financing and power purchase agreements could lead to project cancellations or scope reductions, with NuScale CFPP and RoPower as cautions.
• Advanced SMR fuel supply faces bottlenecks, with limited certainty for HALEU, TRISO, metallic fuel, and molten-salt fuel supply.
• High unit-kilowatt costs and small unit sizes make SMR economics harder to justify than large reactors and existing reactor restarts.
• Regulatory licensing, construction permits, operating licenses, and first-of-a-kind technical risk may cause further delays.
• Policy changes related to Russian enrichment and uranium supply could worsen uncertainty in the fuel cycle.
• Nuclear safety, labor costs, and project execution transparency remain important risks in nuclear investment.

What to watch

• Construction progress and commercial deployment milestones for BWRX-300 at OPG Darlington.
• Whether Westinghouse AP300 and e-Vinci obtain clear customers, financing, and regulatory progress.
• Approval, capex, and interconnection timing for large CEG and VST nuclear restart projects.
• Whether DOE HALEU allocations become sustainable commercial fuel supply rather than demonstration support only.
• Whether NuScale RoPower completes financing, EPC contracts, and PPA structures, and can advance toward its 2033 target.
• Whether TerraPower Natrium fuel loading, operating license applications, and 2031 commercial operation target continue to be delayed.
• Whether tight uranium enrichment SWU conditions lead to higher tails assay and overfeeding, thereby increasing UF6 and U3O8 demand.